Letter to Dr. Timothy K. Killeen (President of University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign) 
On Transparency from Universities on National Security Risks Posed by 

Chinese Nationals in STEM Programs

March 19, 2025

Letters

Timothy L. Killeen
President 
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign 
506 South Wright Street 
Urbana, IL 61801 

Dear Mr. Killeen,

The United States is at a dangerous crossroads where the pursuit of short-term financial 
gains by academic institutions jeopardizes long-term global technological leadership and 
national security. Our nation's universities, long regarded as the global standard for 
excellence and innovation, are increasingly used as conduits for foreign adversaries to 
illegally gain access to critical research and advanced technology. Nonetheless, too many 
U.S. universities continue to prioritize financial incentives over the education of American 
students, domestic workforce development and national security. They do so by admitting 
large numbers of Chinese nationals into advanced STEM programs, potentially at the expense 
of qualified Americans. Accordingly, we write to request information regarding your 
university's policies and oversight mechanisms concerning the enrollment of Chinese national 
undergraduate, graduate, and PhD students, their involvement in federally funded research, 
and the security of sensitive technologies developed on campus.

The significant tuition revenue generated by international students—many of whom pay full 
tuition—has caused elite universities to become financially dependent on foreign enrollment, 
particularly from China. This reliance on foreign students, especially those from 
adversarial nations, raises serious concerns about the displacement of American talent, the 
outsourcing of expertise, and the long-term implication for U.S. technological leadership 
and economic security. The intelligence community has warned that American campuses are 
"soft targets" for espionage and intellectual property theft. The U.S. Department of Justice 
has further raised concerns that "international students' motives aren't just to learn but 
to share that intelligence with foreign superpowers to see a competitive advantage." These 
warnings make clear that this issue is not merely economic. It is a matter of national 
security. As China aggressively pursues dominance in strategic industries, the unchecked 
enrollment of Chinese nationals in American institutions risks facilitating the 
technological transfers that strengthen Beijing's military and economic competitiveness at 
our nation's expense.

The large influx of Chinese national students into the United States presents a growing 
national security challenge. Each year, hundreds of thousands of Chinese nationals study in 
the United States, with some gaining access to cutting-edge research in fields such as 
artificial intelligence, quantum computing, semiconductors, and aerospace engineering. One 
third of all foreign graduate students studying STEM fields at U.S. universities are Chinese 
nationals. Some of these students are directly linked to Chinese state-backed funding 
sources, government talent recruitment programs, and research institutions tied to China's 
military-industrial complex. Simply put, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has established a 
well-documented, systematic pipeline to embed researchers in leading U.S. institutions, 
providing them direct exposure to sensitive technologies with dual-use military 
applications. According to a study conducted by Harvard University, only 25% of Chinese 
graduate students intend to immigrate to the United States or another Western country after 
completing their graduate programs. More concerning, however, is that nearly half remain in 
the United States only temporarily for post-graduate employment before returning to China; 
and 25% of the students intend to return to China immediately after graduation. This pattern 
raises significant concerns about the extent to which Chinese nationals, after gaining 
expertise in highly advanced fields, ultimately transfer knowledge back to China.

The brain drain of critical expertise is not a coincidence but a reflection of Beijing's 
explicit strategy to leverage academia for technological advancement. The CCP's talent 
recruitment programs actively incentivize students and researchers to return to China and 
apply their acquired skills in ways that directly benefit the regime's economic and military 
ambitions. As a result, U.S. universities serve as training grounds for China's 
technological ascendance. Without stronger protections, American academic institutions risk 
facilitating the very innovation that the Chinese government seeks to use to outcompete and 
surpass the United States.

A September 2024 joint report from the House Select Committee on China and House Committee 
on Education and Workforce revealed several instances where American researchers, benefiting 
from federally funded programs, have enabled China to achieve significant technological 
advancements in critical and emerging technologies. The committees found that this has often 
led to the transfer of dual-use technologies pivotal to China's strategic objectives, 
including artificial intelligence and semiconductor research. By failing to retain these 
skilled individuals or admit students more likely to remain in the country, U.S. 
universities inadvertently act as incubators for China's technological and military 
advancements.

America's student visa system has become a Trojan horse for Beijing, providing unrestricted 
access to our top research institutions and posing a direct threat to our national security. 
If left unaddressed, this trend will continue to displace American talent, compromise 
research integrity, and fuel China's technological ambitions at our expense. Therefore, we 
respectfully request that you provide written responses to the following requests for 
information and questions as soon as possible but no later than April 1, 2025:

Request for information:

1. Provide a list of all universities that Chinese national students at your university 
previously attended, including their research affiliations.

2. Specify the sources of tuition funding for these individuals (e.g., personal wealth 
scholarships, Chinese talent recruitment programs, Chinese government grants).

3. Identify the type of research Chinese national students are conducting and the programs 
they are participating in at your university.

4. List all university programs that include Chinese national participants, along with the 
sources of funding for these programs.

5. Provide a list of laboratories and research initiatives where Chinese national students 
currently work.

6. Provide a country-by-country breakdown of applicants, admittances, and enrollments at 
your university.

Questions:

1. What percentage of the university's total graduate student body consists of Chinese 
nationals?

2. What percentage of the graduate program's total tuition revenue comes from Chinese 
nationals?

3. What percentage of Chinese graduate students are engaged in federally funded research 
projects?
4. Does your university have policies in place to prevent foreign nationals from working on projects tied to U.S. government grants (e.g., Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Department of Defense, Department of Energy, National Science Foundation funded research)?

5. Have Chinese nationals worked on federally funded research?

6. Does the university have monitoring mechanisms to track foreign students' participation 
in research with military or dual-use applications?

7. What collaborations exist between university faculty and China-based institutions or 
research laboratories?

8. Have any Chinese graduate students disclosed participation in China-backed recruitment 
and talent programs, government grants, or corporate-backed funding initiatives?

9. Are there restrictions on Chinese nationals enrolling in export-controlled coursework 
(e.g., advanced semiconductor engineering, quantum computing, AI, and aerospace 
engineering)?

10. What percentage of Chinese graduates from your university remain in the United States, 
and what percentage return to China?

11. Are Chinese nationals disproportionately concentrated in high-tech fields such as AI, 
quantum computing, robotics, aerospace, and semiconductors?

12. Are there any background screening processes for Chinese nationals applying to sensitive 
research programs?

13. Do any faculty members maintain research ties with Chinese institutions or researchers? 
If so, which universities and/or researchers in China?

14. How many Chinese STEM graduates return to China, and what industries or institutions do 
they typically join (e.g., Huawei, Chinese Academy of Sciences, China Electronics Technology 
Group Corporation, Aviation Industry Corporation of China, etc.)?

The House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the 
Chinese Communist Party has broad authority to investigate and submit policy recommendations 
on countering the economic, technological, security, and ideological threats of the Chinese 
Communist Party to the United States and allies and partners of the United States under H. 
Res. 5 Sec. 4(a).

Thank you for your attention to the important matter and we appreciate your prompt and full 
reply.

Sincerely,

John Moolenaar
Chairman
House Select Committee on the CCP

Champaign.com

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March 22, 2025